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yoked, however, to save a subscription where the request or invita-
tion that the promisee go on with his work can be implied from the
subscription agreement.16
The old concept which regarded a contract as creating a strictly
personal obligation and was, therefore, not assignable, has long been
abandoned by common law 17 and by statute.' 8  The rule at present
is that any property right, not necessarily personal is assignable.
H. P. M.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE POWERS-IMPAIRMENT OF
THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS-SEC-
TIONS 1083-A AND 10 8 3-B CIVIL PRACTIcE ACT CONSTRUED.-Plain-
tiff was the assignee of a bond and mortgage executed prior to the
mortgage moratorium legislation of 1933.1 On September 22, 1933, a
foreclosure action was commenced and after the sale of the property
plaintiff duly made a motion for the resulting deficiency. The trial
court denied the motion 2 whereupon the plaintiff discontinued the
foreclosure action as against the defendant and brought the present
action on the bond for the deficiency. The dismissal of this com-
plaint by the lower court on the ground that it failed to state a cause
of action 3 was affirmed by the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals.4  Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the appellant argued that Sections 1083-a and 1083-b of the
Civil Practice Act were unconstitutional as they impaired the obliga-
WHITNEY, op. cit. supra, at p. 106. "Certain at least it is that we have adopted
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in con-
nection with our law of charitable subscriptions," per Cardozo, J., in Allegheny
College v. National Chautaugua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369 at p. 374, 159
N. E. 173.
" Instant case.
" Hopkins v. Upshur, 20 Tex. 89 (1857) (charitable subscription case).
"
8 PEs. PRoP. LAW § 41; Rosenthal Paper Box Co. v. National Folding
B. & P. Co., 226 N. Y. 313 (1919); Oconto Chamber of Commerce Co. v.
Gradwell, 175 Wis. 447, 185 N. W. 544 (1921). The duties created by such a
contract are non-assignable. Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890
(1928) ; Smith v. Morin Bros., Inc., 233 App. Div. 562, 253 N. Y. Supp. 368
(4th Dept. 1931).
'Laws of 1933, c. 793 and 794, in effect Aug. 28, 1933.
2 Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1083-a provides that a deficiency judgment may not be
obtained where the market value of the mortgaged premises exceeds the amount
of the judgment plus other liens, encumbrances and expenses of the action.
Civ. PpAc. AcT § 1083-a provides an exclusive manner for the granting
of a deficiency judgment and it must be granted in the foreclosure action.
'271 N. Y. 562, 3 N. E. (2d) 186 (1936), aff'd, on reargument 271 N. Y.
662, 3 N. E. (2d) 473 (1936) (where the remittitur was amended to state that
"a Federal question was presented and necessarily passed upon" in order to
facilitate an appeal to the Supreme Court).
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tions of contracts.5 The Supreme Court refused to review the deci-
sion but vacated the judgment and remanded the cause for further
proceedings. 6 Upon the rehearing, held, Sections 1083-a and 1083-b
of the Civil Practice Act are constitutional and do not violate the in-
hibition of the Federal Constitution and therefore plaintiff's action on
the bond for the deficiency was properly dismissed. Honeyman v.
Hatan, 275 N. Y. 382, 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (1937). 7
The statutes which have been recently enacted in many states s
for the relief of mortgagors reflect not alone the plight of those vic-
tims of the depression, but also the inability 9 or unwillingness 10 of
courts of equity, in general, to afford them uniform relief. However,
prior to the enactment of such legislation some courts attempted to
cope with the problem under the guise of the "inherent powers of
equity." 11 The outstanding example of such judicial relief was the
case of Suring State Bank v. Giese.12 In that case the court, taking
'U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10.
'300 U. S. 14, 57 Sup. Ct. 350 (1937) (where the Court stated: "Before
the Supreme Court may review a decision of a state court, it must appear
affirmatively from the record that a Federal question was necessarily passed
upon. A certificate from the state court so stating is insufficient").
'This decision was again affirmed by the Supreme Court, - U. S.
58 Sup. Ct. 273 (1937).
'See list of states in Note (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 660. For a discussion
of such statutes see Bunn, Tle Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insur-
ance Moratoria (1933) 1 CHI. L. Rlv. 249; Feller, Moratory Legislation: A
Comparative Study (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1061; Allen, Constitutional and
Economic Aspects of Mortgage Moratorium Legislation (1933) 17 MARQ. L.
REv. 200; (1933) 32 Mic. L. REv. 71; (1934) 19 CORN. L. Rlv. 316.
'Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. R~v. 20. But see
dissenting opinion of Justice Cardozo in Graf. v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N. Y.
1, 171 N. E. 884 (1930) ("Let the hardship be strong enough, and equity will
find a way, though many a formula of inaction may seem to bar the path").
Contra: Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Co., 147 Misc. 374, 265
N. Y. Supp. 115 (1933), where the court denied that it had discretion to grant
the relief sought.
"Attempts to interpose a defense of actual value have been consistently
unsuccessful. See Floore v. Morgan, 175 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915),
where it was said: "It is a well settled rule that an unpropitious market for the
sale of properties is no ground for enjoining the sale." See also discussion of
Bolick v. Prudential Ins. Co., 164 S. E. 335 (N. C. 1932), discussed in Notes
(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 87; (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 172. For a list of
cases consistent with the above statement see 42 YAI L. J. 960 (1933).
'Federal Title & Mtge. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200,
166 Atl. 538 (1933) (court refused to confirm a sale under a mortgage
foreclosure which had resulted in a grossly inadequate price, unless the
mortgagee assented to credit the bond with the fair value of the property);
Lurie v. J. J. Hackenjos Co., 113 N. J. Eq. 504, 167 Atl. 766 (1933). See also
Cary, Brammer-Smith and Sullivan, Powers of Courts of Equity (1935) 27
ILL. L. Rsv. 855. Contra: Bank of Manhattan Co. v. Ellda Corp., 241 App.
Div. 131, 271 N. Y. Supp. 522, aff'd, 267 N. Y. 554, 196 N. E. 576 (1934)(which reversed a decision of the lower court and ordered foreclosure).
2210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933). This case has been extensively
annotated. See (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 286; (1933) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 154;(1933) 7 COL. L. REv. 744; (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 950; (1933) 18 ST. Louis
L. REv. 265; Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960, where it is thus, succinctly stated:
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judicial notice of the economic depression and the resultant lack of a
substantial market for realty, denied a deficiency judgment on the
ground that the present value 13 of the premises was greater than the
amount of the mortgage. The reasoning in this decision formed the
basis 14 upon which a good part of the emergency legislation was
formulated.
Several state courts held such emergency legislation unconstitu-
tional on the ground that the legislation impaired the obligations of
contracts.15 However, this trend was halted by a Supreme Court
decision 1 6 upholding the "emergency legislation" of Minnesota. In
resolving this issue in favor of the validity of the statute, the Court
relied upon the hitherto vaguely defined "emergency doctrine" for-
mulated in the famous Rent cases.17
The New York Legislature passed its mortgage moratorium
legislation in the summer of 1933 as a temporary emergency mea-
sure 18 to give relief to mortgagors and to prevent their becoming bur-
dened with deficiency judgments sometimes as large as the mortgage.
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, in sustaining this legisla-
"The Wisconsin court appears to have taken the initial step in the judicial field
toward a solution of the mortgage problem."; (1933) 17 MINN. L. REV. 821.
" "Present value is that price which property will bring when it is offered
for sale by one who wishes but is not obliged to sell, and it is bought by one
who is willing but not obliged to buy." See Bonbright, The Problem of Judicial
Valuation (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 476. The court also suggested the use of the
"upset price" in land foreclosure sales to protect the mortgagor, i.e., the price
at which any subject, as lands or goods, is exposed to sale by auction, below
which it is not to be sold (Bouvier's Law Dict.). See also Gilligan and Stern,
Protecting the Rights of Mortgagors, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 29, 1933, p. 688, col. 1;
(1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 305.
"The "'fair market value" doctrine espoused in the case of Suring State
Bank v. Giese is found in §§ 10,83-a, 1083-b of the CiV. PRAC. ACT.
' North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas and Minnesota. In Minnesota the court
held that the statute impaired the obligation of contracts, but upheld it as a
valid exercise of emergency police power. Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334 (1933).
"Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231
(1934), where Hughes, Ch. J., speaking for the majority of the Court in a
5-4 decision, said: "Although an emergency does not create power, it does
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power." Cf. Ex Parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
"1 Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920) ; Marcus Brown
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1920); Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289 (1921); People ex rel. Durham
Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921) ; Guttag v.
Shatzkin, 230 N. Y. 647, 130 N. E. 929 (1921).
'The legislation was limited until July 1, 1934, but by subsequent enact-
ments the "emergency legislation" has been extended to July 1, 1938. It is most
likely that such legislation will be extended. But see the case of Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405 (1923) where it was said:
"It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the emergency still exists upon
which the continued operation of the law depends." It is not improbable that
Section 1083-a will be continued on the statute books as a permanent law.
What effect such a course would have on the sale of mortgages is left open.
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tion, relied upon the aforementioned emergency doctrine,19 i.e., eco-
nomic conditions may arise in which a temporary restraint of en-
forcement of contracts will be consistent with the spirit and purpose
of the contract clauses and thus be within the range of the reserved
power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community.2 0
This holding is in line with the fundamental principle of constitu-
tional law that the interdiction of statutes against impairment of con-
tracts does not prevent the state from exercising such powers as are
vested in it for the promotion of the common weal and the protection
of the public.2' It is apparent that such right of the state is paramount
to any rights under contracts between individuals.2 2  Furthermore, it
may be argued that the "obligation of a contract is not impaired by
a law modifying the remedy for its enforcement but not so as to sub-
stantially impair the rights secured by the contract." 23 Although the
mortgagee's vested cause of action is property,2 4 and is protected from
arbitrary interference, he has no property right, in the constitutional
sense, in any partitcular form of remedy; all that he is guaranteed
by the Constitution is the preservation of his substantive right to re-
dress by some effective procedure.2 5
In considering the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court of the United States did not pass upon the constitutionality of
that part of Sections 1083-a and 1083-b of the Civil Practice Act
which allowed the mortgagor to set off the fair market value of the
property in a suit by the mortgagee for a deficiency judgment.26 The
Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that no substantial 2 7 federal
question was involved inasmuch as the right of the state to declare
that a deficiency judgment must be secured in the foreclosure action
is not open to federal inquiry. It seems quite probable, however, that
if this question is actually brought before the Supreme Court, the
legislation will be upheld on the theory that it is a proper exercise
of the police power of the state.
G. A. R.
See note 17, ,supra.Qc Ibid.
'Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1920)("All contracts are made subject to the exercise of the police power of the
state").
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 123 (1905).
'Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231(1934).
-'Pritehard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124 (1881).
_ Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 54 Sup. Ct. 140 (1934).
'- U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 273, 274, the Court stated: "The question of the
validity of the State legislation could have been raised in the foreclosure action
and brought to this court in accordance with applicable rules."
-, Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 (1877) ; Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160
U. S. 389, 16 Sup. Ct. 344 (1896); Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co.,
169 U. S. 557, 18 Sup. Ct. 445 (1898) ; Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Snell, 193 U. S
30, 24 Sup. Ct. 319 (1903) ; Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U. S. 367, 37 Sup. Ct. 165(1916) ; Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 54 Sup. Ct. 140 (1933) ; Lansing
Drop Forge Co. v. Am. State Say. Bank, 297 U. S. 697, 56 Sup. Ct. 593
(1935) ; Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U. S. 99, 57 Sup. Ct. 65 (1936).
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